

09/12/012

S E C R E T 091152Z MAY 74

25X1

HAKTO-65

FM: JERRY BREMER

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

1. REFERENCE YOUR TONAK 120, SECRETARY DOES NOT WANT KARNOW
TO PUBLISH THE LETTER.

2. BEST REGARDS

BT

#0065

NNNN

State Dept. review completed

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

MORI/CDF
C03344769 pages
4-5



المملكة العربية السعودية
عدد

التاريخ

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

MAY 9, 1974

HAKTO = 65

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: JERRY BREMER

1. Reference your TOHAK 120, Secretary does not want Karnow to publish the letter.

2. Best regards.

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/29 :
LOC-HAK-259-6-61-1

STANLEY KARNOW WANTS TO PUBLISH
LETTER SCOWCROFT SENT HIM ON YOUR
BEHALF.

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/29 :
LOC-HAK-259-6-61-1

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FM THE SITUATION ROOM

TO USCONSUL JERUSALEM

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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TOHAK120

PLEASE DELIVER TO BREMER/RODMAN FOR THE SECRETARY
TO HAK 120

TO: HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

YOU WILL RECALL THAT YOU ASKED ME TO WRITE A LETTER TO STANLEY KARNOW AFTER YOU LEFT POINTING OUT TO HIM SEVERAL ERRORS OF FACT IN HIS ARTICLE ABOUT YOU IN THE NEW REPUBLIC. STANLEY HAS NOW CALLED ME TO ASK IF MY LETTER CAN BE PUBLISHED, OBVIOUSLY ACCOMPANIED BY FURTHER REMARKS BY HIM AS PART OF A CONTINUING DIALOGUE. I SEE LITTLE TO BE GAINED BY ENGAGING IN SUCH AN EXCHANGE, BUT YOU MAY FEEL OTHERWISE. THE LETTER I SENT HIM IS AS FOLLOWS:

State Dept. review completed
pages 4-5

MAY 1, 1974

DEAR MR. KARNOW:
JUST BEFORE HE DEPARTED FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, SECRETARY KISSINGER ASKED IF I WOULD WRITE TO YOU IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR NEW REPUBLIC ARTICLE, "WHERE'S HENRY NOW?" HE DOES NOT AT ALL WISH TO ARGUE WITH THE JUDGEMENTS YOU SET FORTH, BUT HE WANTED ME TO POINT OUT TO YOU THAT THE ARTICLE DOES CONTAIN A NUMBER OF FACTUAL INACCURACIES.

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WITH REGARD TO THE VIETNAM SETTLEMENT, FOR EXAMPLE, THE U.S. HAD NEVER HAD, UNTIL OCTOBER 1972, AN OPTION FROM THE NORTH VIETNAMESE FOR A SETTLEMENT ON TERMS WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE PRESIDENT THIEU'S OUSTER. THE QUESTION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES REMAINING IN SOUTH VIETNAM HAD NOT FOR FOUR YEARS BEEN AN OBSTACLE TO A SETTLEMENT. THAT OBSTACLE, BEFORE OCTOBER 1972, HAD BEEN THE DEMAND FOR THE REMOVAL OF THIEU.

WITH RESPECT TO THE MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON 1 OCTOBER, IT IS WHOLLY INCORRECT TO SAY THAT ONLY SCHLESINGER WAS PRESENT. ATTENDING THE ENTIRE MEETING WERE SECRETARY SCHLESINGER, DIRECTOR COLBY, ADMIRAL MOORER, GENERAL HAIG, AND MYSELF. IN SHORT, EXCEPT FOR THE PRESIDENT, THE ENTIRE EXECUTIVE MEMBERSHIP OF THE NSC WAS PHYSICALLY PRESENT, THERE NOT BEING AT THAT TIME A VICE PRESIDENT. MOREOVER, OUTSIDE THE MEETING ROOM THERE WAS A TASK FORCE OF THE NSC STAFF WORKING ON SOVIET ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION AND, IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, A SIMILAR TASK FORCE WORKING ON MIDDLE EAST ASPECTS. I SHOULD ALSO POINT OUT THAT THE JUDGEMENTS RENDERED BY THE MEETING PARTICIPANTS WERE UNANIMOUS.

YOUR STATEMENT ABOUT AN ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THE WHEAT DEAL AND THE CONCLUSION OF THE FIRST STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENT IS ALSO INACCURATE. THE WHEAT DEAL HAD NOTHING WHATEVER TO DO WITH THE 1972 SALT AGREEMENT. WHEAT WAS NEVER DISCUSSED BY PRESIDENT NIXON AND GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV AT THE SUMMIT. THERE HAD EARLIER BEEN DISCUSSIONS ABOUT WHEAT BETWEEN LOWER LEVEL OFFICIALS, BUT THEY PROVED TO BE ABORTIVE. THE AMOUNTS BEING CONSIDERED WERE DEEMED TO BE TOO SMALL TO BE WORTHY OF CONSIDERATION AT THE SUMMIT. THE WHEAT DEAL WHICH WAS SUBSEQUENTLY CONSUMMATED WAS NOT PICKED UP FOR AT LEAST FOUR WEEKS THEREAFTER AND THEN IN PURELY TECHNICAL CHANNELS-- AND IN TERMS VERY DIFFERENT FROM WHAT HAD BEEN EARLIER PROPOSED.

I MIGHT POINT OUT, IN CLOSING, THAT YOUR INTIMATION THAT SALT I MAY HAVE "OFFERED THE RUSSIANS AN EDGE" HARDLY APPEARS JUSTIFIED. THE RESTRICTIONS ON OFFENSIVE WEAPONS CONTAINED IN SALT I LAY IN THOSE AREAS WHERE THE USSR HAD UNDER WAY VERY ACTIVE PROGRAMS--THE CONSTRUCTION OF LAND AND SEA BASED LAUNCHERS. CONVERSELY, AREAS WHERE THE U.S. ENJOYED RELATIVE ADVANTAGE--BOMBERS AND MIRV'S-- REMAINED UNCONSTRAINED. AN EXAMINATION OF THE GROWING DISPARITY IN THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE USSR SINCE THE SALT I AGREEMENT AMPLY ILLUSTRATES THIS LATTER POINT.

SINCERELY,
BRENT SCOWCROFT
MAJOR GENERAL, USAF
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

DO YOU WANT TO LET HIM PRINT THE LETTER?

WARM REGARDS.

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yes
no

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